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During the 1998 party conference The Sun famously pronounced the Conservative Party 
dead. As a Hague-faced parrot swung from its perch, the accompanying headline read: ‘This 
party is no more ... it has ceased to be ... this is an ex-party.’ The paper diagnosed the cause 
of death: ‘suicide’. As things turned out, contra the original Monty Python sketch, the 
Conservative Party was not totally expired – it had not ceased to be, although it had slipped 
into a very deep slumber. After the trauma of landslide electoral defeat in 1997 a preference 
for closing its eyes to the enormous scale of the task of rebuilding its electoral appeal could 
perhaps be forgiven. No such excuse could be advanced following the deafening wake-up call 
sounded by the 2001 general election. ‘Labour’s second landslide’ produced another defeat of 
similar statistical magnitude, arguably the worst result in the Conservative Party’s history 
(Geddes and Tonge, 2001; Tyrie, 2001: 3). If any acclaim can be attributed to the Hague 
years it is that the doomsday scenario of further losses was averted. Although it remained on 
life-support, the Conservative Party had at least avoided the fate of the Liberal party and 
inexorable decline to third party status – political death in a first-past-the-post electoral 
system. But on almost any measure 2001 represented the nadir of the Conservatives’ travails. 
In terms of seats the Conservatives made a nominal advance of one, although not at the 
expense of any other party (they regained Tatton, the seat vacated by the independent MP 
Martin Bell). The performance in terms of votes was little better. At the 2001 election, the 
Conservatives received 8.35 million votes, over 1.25 million fewer than in 1997. On a 
substantially reduced turnout, the party’s share of the vote advanced by one percent, but the 
polls suggested that a higher turnout would have worked against them (Butler and Kavanagh, 




The crisis facing the Conservatives in 2001 was also more than an electoral one. It was a 
crisis of ideology, mission and narrative. As Tim Bale (2010) has argued, under the 
leadership of William Hague short-term tactics prevailed over any coherent conception of a 
long-term strategy. The Conservatives under Hague failed to communicate a convincing 
narrative explaining to the electorate what conservatism was for. In substantial part this 
reflected a failure of leadership, but more fundamentally it also stemmed from a long-term 
ideological crisis about the very nature of post-Thatcherite conservatism (Hayton, 2012; 
Gamble, 1995). One manifestation of this was the sense of ambiguity surrounding 
Conservative attempts to articulate one of their most traditional themes and pillar of their 
electoral support: a clear sense of nationhood. The 1997 election reduced the Conservatives 
to a rump of 165 MPs largely in the south and east of England, with no representation in 
Scotland or Wales.1 In spite of this status as the de facto English party the Conservatives 
remained wedded to a traditional idea of Britain – as Wellings (2007: 410) has argued, ‘the 
historical merging of Englishness and Britishness continued to operate, leaving English 
nationalism without coherence’. However, in the evolving context of devolution to Scotland 
and Wales and the broader cultural trend of the emergence of a stronger felt and more clearly 
defined sense of English identity (Hayton et al. 2009) the Conservatives were left without a 
clear conception of nationhood which they could communicate effectively to the electorate.  
 
This difficulty was symptomatic of the Conservative Party’s problems between 1997 and 
2001. Unsure of its own purpose, and facing a centrist New Labour government in its 
ascendency, the Conservative Party under Hague was unable to fashion a convincing 
response to the question ‘why vote Conservative?’ and fell back on a core-vote strategy 
lacking widespread appeal. Following Hague’s resignation the Conservatives needed to 
identify a leader capable of formulating and conveying an answer to that question which 
would invigorate the party and enthuse the electorate. As Peter Snowdon later commented, ‘If 
ever there was a time for an inspired leader to lift the Tories out of the gloom, it was now’ 
(2010: 75). Who would answer the call for the Conservatives in their hour of need?  
 
At the outset the odds-on favourite with the bookmakers was Michael Portillo, although it 
was ‘not entirely certain that he would even enter the contest’ (Alderman and Carter, 2002: 
                                                
1 They did little better in 2001, winning one seat in Scotland and none in Wales.  
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572). Portillo was one of only two men (the other being the former Chancellor, Kenneth 
Clarke) widely assumed capable of returning the Conservatives to power. Portillo had, 
however, caused substantial unease amongst former admirers on the right of the party who 
shared with Thatcher the view that he ‘had “lost his way” since his conversion to “touchy 
feely” Conservatism’ (Walters, 2001: 213). For the Thatcherites, Portillo’s personal and 
political journey to an agenda of social liberalism and uncompromising modernisation was 
less a voyage of discovery and more the confused wanderings of a prodigal son yet to realise 
the error of his ways and return to the comforts of their ideological home. Had he been 
willing to compromise and sound a dog-whistle or two he would in all likelihood have made 
it to the final ballot of party members. Keen to secure a mandate firmly on his own terms he 
was unwilling to do so, and was eliminated by one vote (Hayton and Heppell, 2010: 428). As 
analysis by Heppell and Hill demonstrated, Portillo’s inability to capture the votes of ‘pure 
Thatcherites’ proved fatal to his chances: ‘it was their abandonment of Portillo that was 
critical to his elimination and the eventual election of Duncan Smith as party leader’ (2010: 
50). One Portillo supporter, John Bercow, suggested that the result could be easily 
understood: ‘for Ken’s Europhilia substitute Michael’s socially liberal credentials’. For him, 
Portillo ‘was clearly the modernising candidate in 2001’ but the party ‘wasn’t ready for and 
wasn’t signed-up to the idea that it needed fundamentally to change its approach’ (Bercow 
Interview).  
 
In short, Iain Duncan Smith’s election as Conservative Party leader was less a positive 
endorsement of either the man or his message, and more to do with who he was not and what 
he did not represent. In the final parliamentary ballot he received less than a third of the votes 
available (54 out of 166 MPs supported him). Nonetheless Duncan Smith did achieve a clear 
victory over Clarke in the ballot of party members, securing 61 percent of the vote on a 
turnout of 79 percent. However, as Denham and O’Hara have highlighted, the party 
membership who ultimately selected the leader would have no say about his removal: the 
‘Hague rules’ meant that just 25 MPs could force a vote of confidence, without even the need 
to nominate an alternative candidate (2008: 66). Right from the off, his position as leader 
‘seemed precarious’ (ibid.) – but what, if anything, could he do to enhance his authority and 
secure it?  
 
In his seminal ecture ‘Politics as a Vocation’ the sociologist Max Weber (1918) identified 
three mainstays of legitimate rule: traditional authority; charismatic authority; and formal 
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and/or legal authority derived from holding office. If a custom of deferential obedience was 
ever enjoyed by Duncan Smith’s predecessors it probably died with the ‘magic circle’ – 
democratising the leadership selection procedure formalised the existing actuality that 
incumbents are ultimately beholden to the parliamentary party. The second source Weber 
noted, charisma – in his words ‘a certain quality of an individual personality, by virtue of 
which he is set apart from ordinary men’ – is perhaps more important than ever for the 
modern politician. But not even Duncan Smith’s most loyal lieutenants would have suggested 
he was a man of flair with the ability to inspire a devoted following, and his own depiction of 
himself as the ‘quiet man’ was a tacit acknowledgment of this fact. Consequently, Duncan 
Smith needed to establish his authority through an astute management of the capacities 
available to him through his position as party leader, to reassure doubtful colleagues that he 
was indeed ‘up to the job’. As noted elsewhere, ‘having commenced his party leadership with 
a disputed mandate it was essential that Duncan Smith provided the following: first, a viable 
programme of policy renewal and strategic reorientation; and second, internal unity and 




Iain Duncan Smith was an ineffectual public communicator. As leader of the opposition he 
had three main audiences to address: the Parliamentary Conservative Party (PCP), the wider 
party (i.e. the membership), and the electorate. In each case he failed to connect successfully, 
making little impact with the general public and losing the confidence of his parliamentary 
colleagues and, eventually, the party members whose votes had installed him as leader.  
 
Defeated leadership contender Michael Portillo commented that Duncan Smith ‘wasn’t able 
to perform at the necessary level, so he was desperately undermined by that, and that 
happened pretty much at once’ (Portillo, Interview). In terms of the parliamentary party, this 
inability was rapidly exposed by Duncan Smith’s performances at the despatch box of the 
House of Commons. For any party leader a key opportunity to rally the troops when the 
house was sitting was presented weekly at Prime Minister’s Question Time. Armed with six 
questions, the leader of the opposition has the chance to expose the Prime Minister to 
sustained pressure and scrutiny. Duncan Smith’s early performances were measured and 
overshadowed by international events. The announcement of his accession, originally 
scheduled for 12th September 2001, was delayed by 24 hours as a mark of respect following 
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the terrorist attacks the previous day. In the aftermath of the 9/11 atrocities Tony Blair 
bestrode the world stage, and there was little for Duncan Smith to do other than offer his 
support to the government’s stated determination to stand ‘shoulder to shoulder’ with the 
United States in the ‘war on terror’. As Geoffrey Wheatcroft later commented, as ‘Blair 
played the new Churchill… Duncan Smith could only trail in his wake, as he ineffectually did 
for months to come’ (2005: 254).   
 
Duncan Smith was perhaps also unfortunate that he his immediate predecessor William 
Hague, for all his other weaknesses as Conservative Party leader, was universally recognised 
as one of the most effective parliamentary performers of his generation, and a master of the 
quick fire cut and thrust of PMQs. Unfavourable comparisons were inevitable, one of the 
politer ones being that Duncan Smith was ‘Hague without the jokes’ (Walters, 2001: 225). 
Perhaps partly in recognition of his own limitations as a debater, Duncan Smith consciously 
chose to adopt a less confrontational style than his predecessor, and determinedly stuck to 
topics which he supposed the public would like him to concentrate on, particularly the public 
services. This helped to reinforce in efforts to refocus the Conservatives’ policy agenda (see 
below) but made little impression either within or beyond the Westminster village. As the 
months passed the rumbles of discontent on the Conservative backbenches grew, and the 
party leader was taunted in the House over his persistent nervous habit of clearing his throat – 
pitilessly satirised in Private Eye as Iain Duncan Cough.  
 
Even as he struggled to satisfy the demands of his colleagues in the Commons, the wider 
party membership ought to have been Duncan Smith’s natural constituency. Ideologically he 
was certainly one of them, an uncompromising Euro-sceptic with traditionalist views on 
social and moral matters. In the past he had voted in favour of both hanging and caning, and 
was, as one Telegraph writer observed, ‘a bit 1950s’ (Wheatcroft, 2005: 255). In his 
hardworking campaign for the leadership he had also impressed members with solid 
performances at meetings up and down the country. Once elected however, the most 
important platform for addressing the party membership was the party conference. Through 
guaranteed media coverage conference also provides an opportunity to communicate to the 
electorate at large.  
 
Barely a month after assuming the leadership Duncan Smith’s first conference was inevitably 
overshadowed by the storm clouds of war gathering over Afghanistan, already subject to 
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aerial bombardment and about to face invasion from the American-led mission to overthrow 
the Taliban. His speech was in large part dedicated to September 11th and its consequences, 
although much of the remainder was an effort to refocus the Conservatives’ attention on the 
public services. The Daily Telegraph (11.10.2001) loyally reported Duncan Smith’s pledge to 
put public services first, although even through the eyes of their sycophantic leader writer –
who discerned a vision ‘at once more coherent, more original and more promising than 
anything the Tories have managed since the 1980s’ – as he took the stage he appeared 
‘momentarily bemused’ and ‘began nervously’. The late Hugo Young similarly perceived 
that ‘he seemed embarrassed to bestride the platform’ and ‘doesn't have a shred of excitement 
about him’ and judged that: ‘Only the most desperate Tory acolytes could grace a speech of 
such stupefying dullness with acclaim for its fantastic strategic significance, merely because 
it committed the party to take state schools and hospitals seriously’ (Young, 2001). 
 
The 2002 party conference is best remembered for the pronouncement by the then Chairman 
Theresa May that the Conservatives needed to work to shed their image as ‘the nasty party’. 
It also featured probably the most memorable phrase of Duncan Smith’s leadership, when he 
urged his party: ‘Do not underestimate the determination of a quiet man.’ This undisguised 
effort to make virtue out of necessity was a direct acknowledgment of his own shortcomings 
as an orator, and it might have worked, had he been able to convincingly demonstrate his 
attributes as a leader in other ways. He could not, and when he returned to the theme the 
following year – announcing in a toe-curling tone that ‘the quiet man is here to stay, and he’s 
turning up the volume’ – he found that it was a noise that few even in his own party wanted 
to hear. His foray into modernisation over, Duncan Smith pressed all the traditionalist buttons 
he hoped would appeal to his core constituency in the party membership. Simon Hoggart 
(2003) observed that it was ‘road rage politics’; while in the opinion of another commentator: 
‘Duncan Smith knocked back his opponents by playing to every bigoted bone in the Tory 
body politic’ and ‘flunked’ the real challenge, which was ‘to get cheers for the new face the 
party needs to show if it is to crawl back towards power’ (Glover, 2003). 
 
For the modern politician the most important forum for communicating with the electorate is 
the news media. Television, radio, newspapers and increasingly the internet provide space for 
political leaders to project their message to the public, albeit in most cases without any 
assurances as to how it will be filtered and presented. Unfortunately for him, Duncan Smith 
proved similarly ineffective as a media performer as he was in the House of Commons and on 
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the conference platform. Through his efforts to develop the language of ‘compassionate 
conservatism’ and his stated desire to ‘champion the vulnerable’ Duncan Smith demonstrated 
an appreciation of the need to tackle one of the major electoral problems that the 
Conservative Party faced – namely its nasty party image. However, his poor communication 
skills greatly hindered him in this task, and he made little progress – on most measures 
Conservative Party image data remained stubbornly negative (Hayton, 2012: 51-4).  
 
As Richard Heffernan has argued, the media is n important leadership resource, ‘but it is 
only one resource amongst many’. As he suggests, media attention, and even media 
management by spin doctors, is of little use to a leader who lacks other key skills and 
attributes. Heffernan notes: ‘The stark reality is that while media image can help boost a 
prime minister’s public standing, that public standing will inevitably trump that media image’ 
(2006: 598). The same is true for leaders of the opposition. The media served to expose 
Duncan Smith’s lack of aptitude as a communicator and his other shortcomings as a leader. 
As Snowdon suggests, he ‘failed to get his message across because he failed to present it 
imaginatively and convincingly’ (Snowdon, 2010: 93-4). This failure extended to each of the 
leader’s key constituencies: the electorate, the party membership, backbenchers and even key 
figures in his shadow cabinet. Whatever the merits of his message it was poorly conveyed, 
inconsistently presented, and largely ignored.  
 
Public policy platform 
 
Despite his reputation as a traditionalist hardliner, Duncan Smith showed signs of having 
heeded some of the lessons of defeat. Within weeks of being elected leader, he expressed his 
desire to re-establish the Conservative Party as ‘the party of ideas’ by launching a policy 
review (Seldon and Snowdon, 2005: 259). Duncan Smith also sought to orchestrate a 
concerted effort by the Conservatives to reposition themselves as a party of the public 
services, an agenda that would outlive his leadership and be taken into the 2005 general 
election and beyond. Members of the shadow cabinet made speeches and wrote articles on 
the subject of schools, hospitals and crime consistently over the four years following his 
election. Oliver Letwin, for example, made a series of speeches on the ‘Neighbourly Society’, 
a thoughtful form of conservatism that sought to go beyond free markets (Letwin, 2003). The 
process of policy renewal made progress under Duncan Smith, and his record in this regard 
compares favourably to that of his predecessor (Seldon and Snowdon, 2005: 259-62). By 
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realigning the Conservatives’ policy priorities Duncan Smith hoped to bring about a strategic 
reorientation of the party, so that it was once again seen to be speaking to issues of public 
concern and reoccupying the political centre ground dominated by New Labour. He recalled 
that: ‘I had a sense that the public needed to instinctively begin to re-identify with the party 
that they felt cared about what they did – a big challenge’ (Duncan Smith Interview).  
 
He used his first anniversary as party leader to declare publicly his desire to defeat ‘the five 
giants’ blighting Britain’s poorest communities. The targets he selected – ‘failing schools, 
crime, substandard healthcare, child poverty, and insecurity in old age’ – were less instructive 
than the language he chose to employ, which deliberately echoed that of the Beveridge 
Report (Duncan Smith, 2002; Seldon and Snowdon, 2005: 260-1). The aim of this was not to 
win votes for the Conservative Party in the most deprived areas of Britain, rather Duncan 
Smith believed that: ‘We needed to broaden the party out, stretch the elastic out a bit. And 
that meant going further and deeper than we’d been before’ (Duncan Smith Interview). 
Arguably, only a figure from the right such as Duncan Smith could pursue such a strategy, as 
it drew criticism from that wing of the party (Cowley and Green, 2005: 52). As one early 
assessment of his leadership speculated, Duncan Smith’s ‘willingness to question some 
longstanding party totems suggests that the right-wing credentials that secured his election 
may yet enable him to institute a transformation of the Conservative Party, just as Neil 
Kinnock’s left-wing roots helped him to initiate the modernisation of the Labour Party in the 
1980s’ (Alderman and Carter, 2002: 585). Indeed, seven months into Duncan Smith’s tenure 
his defeated opponent for the leadership, Ken Clarke – who during the contest had 
(accurately) labelled his opponent ‘a hanger and a flogger’ – declared himself ‘surprised and 
delighted’ by his party leader’s efforts to move the  Conservatives to the centre ground, 
particularly through his focus on poverty (Murphy, 2002).  
 
Although Duncan Smith won some unlikely plaudits – he was also praised in late-2002 by 
Michael Portillo (2002) for resisting the ‘constant temptation’ of a right-wing populist agenda 
– the effort to renew the Conservative Party policy platform was far from unproblematic. One 
difficulty was that in spite of the greater persistence of Duncan Smith compared to his 
predecessor, notable inconsistencies remained across a range of policy issues. This reflected 
the continued absence of a coherent overall narrative to bind the (albeit still embryonic) 
Conservative programme together. This disjointed approach flowed from the leader himself, 
as Duncan Smith ‘oscillated’ between a modernising and more traditionalist approach, in part 
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simply in an effort to appease different elements within his own party (Bale, 2010: 159). The 
result was inconsistent signals to the electorate and the risk of appearing opportunistic. Some 
decisions, such as that to oppose the planned introduction of university top-up fees and the 
pledge to restore the earnings link to future rises in the state pension, prompted the latter fear 
even amongst some members of the shadow cabinet (Snowdon, 2010: 94).  
 
Behind many of these difficulties lay a strategic dilemma which Duncan Smith was far from 
resolving, namely how could the Conservatives balance their desire for lower taxes with the 
new dedication to public services? (Taylor, 2005: 144-153). This problem led to 
disagreement between the Conservative leader and his Shadow Chancellor, Michael Howard. 
To give credence to the public services narrative Howard wanted to reassure voters that the 
education and health budgets would be prioritised over tax cuts, by pledging to match 
Labour’s spending plans (Snowdon, 2010: 94). This commitment was suddenly dropped in 
July 2002, as Duncan Smith caved-in to pressure from the right-wing press and the right of 
his parliamentary party. This effectively neutered Conservative efforts to gain ground from 
the government on these issues, as ‘any criticism the Conservatives made of the two services 
the public most cared about could easily be countered by asking them (endlessly but 
nonetheless effectively) how precisely they planned to improve those services by spending 
less’ (Bale, 2010: 159).  
 
While some inchoate thinking by Duncan Smith undoubtedly contributed to this difficulty, 
had either Clarke or Portillo secured the Conservative leadership in 2001 they would have 
faced a similar dilemma over how to respond to the Blairite Labour hegemony. The context 
of a public perception of economic crisis and national decline, which had given Thatcherite 
solutions their electoral appeal, no longer applied. The Labour Party had successfully made 
the funding and improvement of public services the electorate’s key concern, by accepting 
the free market in many areas but questioning the extent to which untrammelled market 
liberalism and privatisation could deliver them effectively. Even as market-based initiatives 
such as the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) have been spread throughout the public services, 
Labour successfully preserved the mass state provision of health and education services free 
at the point of delivery. In this sense, the major accomplishment and legacy of the Blair 
government was the fencing-off of a distinct public sector, and the apparent creation of a new 
consensus on the scope of the state in the early twenty-first century. Under Duncan Smith, 
like Hague before him, Conservative thinking on  
10 
 
policy continued to be framed firmly within Thatcherite ideological parameters, and 
consequently the party ‘evolved neither a convincing narrative nor effective statecraft’ in 




Duncan Smith’s leadership was plagued by party management problems, many of which a 
more adroit leader might have sidestepped or diffused. His downfall after little more than two 
years in office – which left the former Scots Guardsman with the ignominious honour of 
being the first Conservative Party leader since Neville Chamberlain not to take his party into 
a general election – may have been avoided had he demonstrated a greater aptitude in this 
regard. Indeed, a key attraction to Duncan Smith’s colleagues of his successor Michael 
Howard was the latter’s reputation as a firm disciplinarian who would bring order to the 
parliamentary party.  Some of Duncan Smith’s party management problems undoubtedly 
derived from the fact that he was not the first choice leader of a majority of his parliamentary 
colleagues. Nonetheless, lacking the skill to make the best out of bad job, he contrived to 
make a difficult situation worse.  
 
One episode that served to illustrate both Duncan Smith’s ineptitude as a party manager and 
the problematic context he faced was the row that exploded over the ostensibly minor issue of 
the passage of the government’s Adoption and Children Bill in November 2002. The House 
of Lords had amended the legislation to the effect that only married couples could adopt 
children, and the government sought to repeal these revisions in the Commons to grant 
unmarried and same-sex couples equal rights. For Labour and the Liberal Democrats, this 
was relatively uncontroversial (Dorey, 2004: 376). For the Conservatives however, it was 
much more contentious, exposing once again tensions in the party between social liberals and 
social traditionalists which had become a notable source of disagreement during the Hague 
years (Hayton, 2012: 102-118). 
 
The dilemma for the party was whether they should follow prominent modernisers such as 
Portillo in taking a liberal view and accepting these different forms of family life, or continue 
to advocate the primacy of marriage, which for the majority of Conservative MPs remained 
their preferred model for raising children. The easiest way out of this difficulty for Duncan 
Smith would have been to allow a free vote, but as a staunch social traditionalist himself he 
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instead chose to impose a three-line whip against the changes. The result was a public split 
and a leadership crisis that was ‘almost entirely self-inflicted and eminently avoidable’ 
(Cowley & Stuart, 204: 357). Thirty-five Conservatives absented themselves from the 
Commons, and eight MPs defied the whip and voted against the party line. The eight 
included ex-leadership challengers Clarke and Portillo; four former Shadow Cabinet 
members (David Curry, Andrew Lansley, Andrew Mackay and Francis Maude); and most 
damagingly, John Bercow, who resigned from the Shadow Cabinet in order to rebel (Cowley 
& Stuart, 2004: 357). This marked a turning point both for Duncan Smith’s leadership and for 
party management of sexual/moral political issues in the PCP. In terms of issue management, 
the lesson for the Conservatives was clear: the party was divided, and free votes on 
‘conscience’ issues offered the most effective means to prevent them from attracting media 
interest and becoming public displays of disunity. Duncan Smith adopted this tactic when, in 
March 2003, the government once again brought forward legislation to repeal Section 28, and 
it was also used by Cameron and Howard.  
 
Underlying the gay adoption row was a more fundamental intraparty disagreement that 
dogged Duncan Smith’s leadership, namely the debate over whether, and how, the party 
should seek to ‘modernise’ in an effort to rejuvenate its image and broaden its appeal. Back 
in 1998 The Times had argued that the key dividing line in the Conservative Party was no 
longer over Europe or between left and right, but that: ‘the real division is between liberals 
and reactionaries, modernisers and traditionalists, those armed primarily with principle and 
those whose first instinct is to take shelter in institutions’. Furthermore, for the Conservatives 
to regain power, the ‘liberals must first win the battle of ideas within their party’ (The Times, 
1998). The leader went on: 
 
The more important argument the Conservative Party still needs to have is between thos  
sensitive to changing times and those inclined to nostalgia. It is a battle, we believe, between 
Tory Mods and Rockers. In the Sixties the former were those comfortable with change, the 
latter those who followed old fads. It is the difference between those with a gaze fixed on new 
horizons and those either blinkered or still dreaming. 
 
In other words, advocates of modernisation suggested that regardless of their personal 
preferences, electoral necessity demanded that Conservatives recognise the changing society 
in which they had to operate. The result of the 2001 leadership election, however, represented 
a clear defeat for ‘the mods’ – both  candidates presented to the party membership (Ken 
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Clarke and Iain Duncan Smith) eschewed the ‘modernising’ label, its chief advocate 
(Portillo) having been eliminated by the final ballot of MPs.  
 
By his own admission Duncan Smith disliked the concept of modernisation, which he 
associated with a rejection of the core tenets of conservatism. In spite of this he did actively 
pursue what he preferred to call a ‘change’ agenda. This left him in the ill-fated position of 
being attacked both by modernisers who were unconvinced by his efforts to change the party, 
and by traditionalists who felt that such moves went too far. Lacking a bedrock of support in 
the PCP Duncan Smith displayed ‘an increasing tendency to match each modernizing move 
with something for the traditionalists’ (Bale, 2010: 159) – an approach destined to infuriate 
rather than placate both camps.  
 
Tim Bale offers a damning indictment of Duncan Smith’s record at managing his party, 
noting that he: ‘presided over a party that at times had descended into institutional chaos, a 
party that was unable to call on the services of many of its most talented individuals, a party 
that that eventually lost the confidence of the economic interests that funded it...’ (Bale, 2010: 
193). It is impossible to effectively defend Duncan Smith against any of these charges. Major 
donors deserted the Conservatives, making it clear that they would not reopen their 
chequebooks until a new leader was in place. Heavyweight figures such as Clarke, Portillo 
and Francis Maude refused to serve under him, but even from the limited pool of talent 
available Duncan Smith’s shadow cabinet appointments drew disproportionally from the right 
of the party. Finally, the leader’s inability to prevent or contain the disunity and dissent that 
plagued the party was exacerbated by his own vacillations on strategy. To meet Duncan 
Smith’s professed desire to ‘change’ the Conservative Party required a leader with a more 
coherent approach pursued with greater resolve than he was able to muster.  
 
Emotional intelligence  
 
Political scientists tend to downplay the significance of personality in politics, preferring 
instead institutional, structural or ideological explanations. Politicians themselves often 
denigrate the media for its seemingly ceaseless interest in the character of political figures – 
which allegedly comes at the expense of an adequate focus on policy or ideas. Yet the 
individual personalities of political leaders often play a crucial role in political outcomes: 
different characters shape events in quite different ways. Even in the case of perhaps the most 
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imposing figure in post-war British politics, Margaret Thatcher, ‘political scientists have 
lavished attention on Thatcherism and its impact, but they have not written much about the 
woman herself’ (Garnett, 2007: 173). In the case of Duncan Smith elite interviews and insider 
accounts his tenure lead to the unavoidable conclusion that concerns over his individual 
character, aptitude and personality were at the forefront of his parliamentary colleagues’ 
minds when they removed him from office.2 Indeed for some, these doubts were firmly in 
their minds during his leadership election campaign. As Bale diplomatically noted, ‘Duncan 
Smith’s biggest problem was that he was not renowned among his colleagues for being the 
sharpest knife in the draw’ (2010: 138). The perception that he was not up to the job dogged 
his leadership, and Duncan Smith did little to dispel it with his poor handling of various 
crises that he faced.  
 
The previous section discussed how Duncan Smith induced a severe party management 
difficulty for himself through his decision to impose a three-line whip on what many regarded 
as a vote of conscience. Duncan Smith interpreted this rebellion as a conspiracy designed to 
destabilise his leadership, and compounded his initial error by seeking to reassert his 
authority through a crackdown on the dissenters. The next day he made a statement on the 
steps of Conservative Central Office calling for the party to ‘unite or die’. In it, he declared 
that he had ‘begun to reconnect the Conservative Party with the views and attitudes of 
contemporary Britain’ – an odd claim given that many in his own party were concerned that 
his position on gay adoption was out of touch with modern Britain. Equally, he asserted that 
he was leading the party with unity in mind, ‘respecting those who would like me to move 
faster and those who feel threatened by our moving at all’. However:  
 
Over the last few weeks a small group of my parliamentary colleagues have decided 
consciously to undermine my leadership. For a few, last night's vote was not about adoption 
but an attempt to challenge my mandate to lead this party. We cannot go on in this fashion. 
We have to pull together or we will hang apart.  
 
The fact that Duncan Smith even felt the need to make an extraordinary appeal to the party 
barely a year into his leadership illustrated the perilous nature of his position, and it was 
strongly rumoured that he was on the brink of resignation (Brogan & Helm, 2002). The 
normally sympathetic Daily Telegraph described it as ‘the most desperate day in the history 
of the Conservative Party’ (Young, 2002). Kenneth Clarke attacked the party leader’s 
                                                
2 See Bale (2010: 134-193); Hayton (2008); Hayton & Heppell (2010); and Snowdo  (2010: 75-119).  
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handling of the ‘entirely self-induced’ crisis (Jones et al., 2002), and within days a 
YouGov/Telegraph opinion poll revealed that 52 percent of Conservative voters thought that 
the election of Duncan Smith had been a mistake. Moreover, 81 percent of supporters and 75 
percent of party members thought he had mishandled the adoption issue by failing to allow 
MPs a free vote (Helm and Sylvester, 2002).  
 
Duncan Smith’s handling of this crisis is an interesting case-study in how he struggled to 
cope with the pressures of leadership. For Snowdon, it was after this ‘desperate appeal for 
unity’ that ‘the Shadow Cabinet lost all hope’ (2010: 107). Rick Nye, who was head of the 
Conservative Research Department at the time, noted that: ‘t e more pressure he was under, 
the more nervous he got and the more desperate he was to show he was in control’ (quoted in 
Snowdon, 2010: 107). As Duncan Smith’s insecurities grew, his judgement diminished. 
Increasingly mistrustful of those around him, a few months later he sacked Nye; party chief 
executive Mark McGregor; and director of field operations Stephen Gilbert from Central 
Office. This purge smacked of desperation and panic, and worse was to follow. The leader’s 
choice of replacement for McGregor, former Maastricht rebel Barry Legg, reflected his 
increasing tendency to assign key posts to friends and close allies rather than to the best 
qualified candidates available. His decision to announce Legg’s appointment without even 
consulting the Party Board (which was technically responsible for it as Legg would be a party 
employee) provoked fury, and ‘risked alienating the constituency representatives whose 
presumed loyalty was one of the main reasons why Tory MPs (who were also worried about 
appearing to stab him in the back while the country was at war) were staying their hands 
before the local elections’ (Bale, 2010: 174). Legg lasted less than three months in the role 
before being forced out, and Duncan Smith was also forced to back down over the removal of 
Gilbert who was ‘reinstated following protests from the board’ (Snowdon, 2010: 110). In 
attempting to crush dissent and shore-up his own position, Duncan Smith’s seemingly 
irrational decisions only served to further undermine it. His leadership style was a bizarre mix 
of a consensual balancing act on one hand, as he tried to please both modernisers and 
traditionalists at the expense of sticking to a clear agenda of his own; interspersed with 









For any leader of the opposition the key test is the electoral one: can they return their party to 
power? Unable to convince his parliamentary colleagues that they had any hope of victory 
under his leadership, Duncan Smith was denied the opportunity to take his party into a 
general election, removed by a vote of no confidence in October 2003. This represented an 
ignominious failure on his part, and history will necessarily judge him harshly as a leader 
lacking authority in his own party, let alone in the country. Yet if he did not sow the seeds of 
electoral recovery he did at least begin to till the land, making a serious attempt to begin the 
process of policy renewal – work that he would continue out of office through the 
establishment of a think-tank, the Centre for Social Justice.  
 
A poor public communicator and disastrous party manager, Duncan Smith unable to persuade 
either his shadow cabinet or the parliamentary party of the virtues of his reorientation 
strategy. He was undermined by a lack of legitimacy, having secured the support of less than 
one third of his parliamentary colleagues in the 2001 leadership election. Duncan Smith had 
some success shifting the Conservatives’ focus away from core vote issues, although even 
this effort was undermined by wavering by the leader himself. His handling of the question of 
adoption rights for gay couples was a cataclysmic failure of party management, and became 
symbolic of the wider sense of his failure as leader. His tactical ineptitude brutally exposed 
ideological divisions and led directly to the end of his leadership. Despite his efforts to widen 
electoral appeal by developing the party’s policies on public services and social justice, 
Duncan Smith was unable to gain support from the modernisers while precisely those efforts 
weakened his support amongst traditionalists. Encumbered by his own rebellious past, he 
could not inspire the confidence or loyalty of his colleagues. In short, Duncan Smith failed 
the most basic test of political leaders, namely the need to establish and maintain his 
authority. The manner of his election granted him little authority in the PCP, and he proved 
unable to establish it through charisma, political skill or through the exercise of his office. 
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